United States Supreme Court
Title VII Protects Gay and Transgender Employees From Unlawful Discrimination Because LGBTQ+ Discrimination is Discrimination Based on SexBOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA
THREE PLAINTIFFS BROUGHT DISCRIMINATION CASES IN DIFFERENT STATES AFTER THEY WERE FIRED FOR BEING GAY OR TRANSGENDER
There were three similar cases before the Supreme Court. Plaintiff Gerald Bostock worked as a child welfare advocate for Defendant Clayton County, Georgia. After Bostock began participating in a gay softball league, he was fired for conduct unbecoming a county employee. Donald Zarda worked as a skydiving instructor in New York. He was fired days after mentioning that he was gay. Aimee Stephens worked for a funeral home in Michigan. At first, she presented as male. After six years, she told the funeral home that she planned to present as a woman, and she was fired. All three brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination in the workplace based on sex. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement between the courts of appeals.
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GAY OR TRANSGENDER STATUS IS DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX
Title VII prohibits employers from taking certain actions “because of” sex. An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex. “[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.” If a male and female employee are each attracted to men, and the employer fires the male employee for being attracted to men, the employer has discriminated against the male for traits or actions it tolerates from female employees. Similarly, an employer who allows employees to present as female if they identified as female at birth, but not if they identified as male at birth, is discriminating based on sex. In both situations, an “employee’s sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision.” If an employer fires any woman discovered to be a Yankees fan, but no men who are Yankees fans, the firing is because of sex, even though another factor is at play. Title VII “doesn’t care” whether multiple factors are at play; if “an employer would not have discharged an employee but for that individual’s sex, the statute’s causation standard is met.” The Supreme Court held: “At bottom, these cases involve no more than the straightforward application of
United States Supreme Court. Decided 6/15/20. 10 S.Ct. 1731. Opinion by Justice Gorsuch.
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